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Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law

and Procedure
BRUCE
DAVID
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()

BERNER*

VANDERCOY**

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys important developments in Indiana criminal law
and procedure over the past year . 1 Section I highlights changes in thesubstantive law of crimes. As usual, this area is relatively static, and
therefore the section is brief. Section II highlights changes in criminal
procedure. As usual, this area is dynamic and the section is therefore
much longer. Although this is a survey of Indiana law, many of the
developments discussed are from th~ United States Supreme Court cases.
'This is necessarily so. No one can practice criminal law, in this state
or in any other, without realizing that a great majority of procedures
are driven by the United States Constitution, as that document is continually interpreted by the high court.
The Indiana appellate courts, too, devoted a large portion of their
energies to issues of criminal procedure. Those decisions are highlighted
as well.

II.

SUBSTANTIVE

A.

The Mens Rea Requirement

In State v. Keihn, the Indiana Supreme Court faced the question
of what mens rea, defined as "culpability" under the M'odel Penal Code
and the Indiana Code, 3 must be proved when the pertinent statute is
silent on the question. At issue was Indiana Code section 9-1-4-52(a),
which provides as follows:
2

A person may not operate a motor vehicle upon the public

highways while his driving privilege, license, or pertnit is suspended or revoked. A person who violates this subsection commits a class A misdemeanor. 4

•

••
1.
2.
3.

4.

Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Valparaiso University School of Law.
Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law.
January 1990 to December 1990.
542 N .E.2d 963 (lnd~ 1989).
See IND. CODE § 35-41-2·2 (1988) and MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962).
IND. CoDE § 9-1-4-Sl(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990).
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Does a person who drives without knowledge of suspension or revocation
violate this provision.? In Keihn, the court answered this question in the
negative.'
Unless the legislature is constitutionally prohibited from defining a
crime without an element of mens rea, 6 which the defendant did not
argue, the court's task is to discover legislative intent. Because nothing
in the legislative histo'r y of this statute spoke explicitly on this point,
the court was placed in the position of applying_general rules of legislative
construction. Previous Indiana cases, however, pointed in opposing directions.'
The court in Keihn cited with approval sections from the 1974lndiana
Criminal Law Study Commission which were not formally adopted and,
although it does not indicate such precisely, the court strongly suggests
that future cases will be judged by the methodology of those provisions:
for felonies: and misdemeanors that are silent on mens rea, the assumption
is that ''wilfully" must be proved; 8 for infractions silent on mens rea,
the assumption is that no mens rea need be proved.9 The logic of this
approach is evident. When a serious criminal penalty is involved, one
cannot assume that the legislature would command punishment without
10
proof of culpability Strict liability in crime runs contrary to history.
If, on the other hand, the liability is for a noncriminal infraction, one
cannot lightly assume that the legislature intended to put the state to
the burdens usually associated with criminal prosecution. This approach,
of course, applies only when legislative intent is unclear. The legislature
is, within constitutional limits, free to specify whatever mens rea or lack
thereof it wishes, provided it does so clearly and explicitly.
jj

B.
In State v.

The Defense of

~'Impossibility ·,,

Haines, 11 the Indiana Second District Court of Appeals

was confronted by a beguiling juxtaposition of the old (the "impossi-

S. Keihn, S42 N .. E.2d at 96S.
6. There is considerable question whether a state could constitutionally remove
proof of mens rea for traditionally serious crimes such as murder. See, e.g., Patterson
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977).
7~ For example, under bm. CoDE § 9..4-l-40 (1988), leaving the scene of an
accident has been interpreted to require proof of knowledge of the accident. See Micinski
v. State, 487 N.E.2d ISO (1986). On the other hand, under IND. CoDE § 9-ll-2~2 to -5
(1988), driving while intoxicated and causing death does not require proof of knowledge
of intoxication. See Smith v. State, 496- N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
8.. "Wilfully, means intentionally, knowingly, -o r recklessly. See IND. CODE § '3541.;2~2 (1988).
'
9, Keihn, 542 N.E.2d at 967.
10. ./d. at 966.
11. S4S N.E.2d '834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
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bility" defense to attempt) and the new (the AIDS virus). Police, responding to a call reporting a possible suicide attempt, discovered the
defendant unconscious in a pool of blood. Upon regaining consciousness,
the defendant informed the officers he had AIDS; threatened to "give
it to them;'' shook his body for the express purpose of splashing his
blood on the officers' faces and eyes; bit the officers and splashed his
blood on the open wounds; and hit one officer in the face with a wig
dripping with defendant's blood. On this evidence, the defendant was
convicted by a jury of three counts of attempted murder. The trial court
subsequently granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the evidence
and vacated the conviction. The State appealed.
Judge Buchanan, writing for the court of appeals, reversed and
remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict. The appellate
court examined the case for, inter alia, the defense of "impossibility. " 12
The traditional approach to attempt differentiated "factual impossibility,'' which is not a defense, from ''legal impossibility,'' which is a
defense. 13 This distinction, which has puzzled generations of law students,
14
is not an easy one to draw . The distinction essentially is between trivial
or temporary factual mistakes 15 and profound or permanently incurable
mistakes. 16 This distinction became unimportant in states, such as Indiana,
that adopted the Model Penal Code provisions on inchoate crimes. 17
Under those provisions, neither type of impossibility is a defense. 18 Judge

12. /d. at 838.
13. W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, ClliMINAL LAw § 6.3 (2d ed. 1986).
14. There is no use trying to think of "factual impossibility" as entailing a factual
mistake and "legal impossibility" as entailing a legal mistake. Defendants who think their
actions are criminal when they are not (who might, in common parlance, be said to be
making a legal mistake) simply have no criminal mens rea and thus need no "defense."
IS. Mitchell v. State, 71 S.W. 17S (Mo. 1902) (defendant who shot toward a bed
thinking the victim was there only to discover he was in another room).
16. Such as in the paradigmatic case of trying to kill someone who is already
dead.
17. IND. CODE § 3!5-41-!5-1 (1988).
18. This change was driven by the Model Penal Code drafters' radically different
understanding of the fundamental purposes for inchoate crimes, including attempt. Whereas
the common-law approach focused on preventing social harm (and, thus, was not troubled
by defendants trying to kill dead people because no harm was possible), the Model Penal
Code's inchoate crime provisions are aimed at identifying "manifestly dangerous persons."
2 MoDEL PENAL CoDB PART I CoMMENTAlliBS I S.Ol (198S). Simply put, defendants who
try to kill dead people are dangerous because they form a criminal mens rea and act on
that intention. The Model Penal Code recognizes .. inherent impossibility" - that is,
.choosing a method of committing a crime that is facially inappropriate to achieve the
intended result (such as throwing darts at x's picture with the intent to kill x). /d. However,
this "inherent impossibility" is not a defense even under the Model Penal Code, but
simply a factor to mitigate the sentence. /d. In any event, "inherent impossibility., is
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Buchanan's opm10n makes it clear that impossibility is not a defense
to attempt in Indiana. 19
In Haines, the defendant also argued, and the trial court apparently
agreed, that the defendant had not taken a "substantial step" toward
commission of the crime, which is the test for the required "act"
element. 20 However, as Judge Buchanan noted, this argument confuses
the "act" requirement with the impossibility defense. 21 Not only did the
defendant commit sufficient acts under the substantial-step test, he committed all the acts he intended. 22 In measuring acts, courts must adopt
the defendant's perspective on reality, in this case, that biting and bloodsplashing can infect the victim with a deadly disease. 23 To adopt some
other reality (for example, that biting cannot transfer the AIDS virus)
is to consider the "impossibility" question under the guise of an "act."
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

A. Arrest, Search, and Seizure
1. The Beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment.-In United States
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 24 federal officials searched, with the permission of
Mexican authorities, the defendant's home in Mexico. The defendant
was a foreign national and his only entry into the United States had
occurred three days earlier when he was involuntarily forced into the
United States under federal arrest. Clearly the warrantless search of his
house would not pass muster under the fourth amendment; 2' however,
the United States Supreme Court held 6-3 that the defendant was not
included within the meaning of "the people" in the fourth amendment.26
Had the defendant been a resident alien or even an illegal alien, the
result might be different. However, the defendant had insufficient connection with the United States to claim the benefit of fourth amendment
protection. 27 The dissent asserted that compliance with the fourth amend-

foreclosed in this case because expert testimony showed that one could, by actions similar
to those of the defendant, infect a victim with the AIDS virus, and that such virus could
produce the death of the victim. Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 841.
19. Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 838-39.
20. /d. at 836.
21. /d. at 838.
22. /d. at 841.
23. /d.
24. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990).
25. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
26. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064.
27. /d.

HeinOnline -- 24 Ind. L. Rev. 726 1990-1991
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ment was an unavoidable correlative of the power to prosecute foreign
nationals under United States penal laws. 28
2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that homeowners, tenants, and paying hotel guests have
a reasonable expectation of privacy in those spaces. 29 The·Supreme Court
in Minnesota v. O/son30 extended the expectation of privacy to overnight,
·nonpaying guests in private homes. 31 The Court was careful to explain
that its holding does not indicate that everyone lawfully on premises
has this expectation. 32 In Olson, the defendant, an overnight guest of
the homeowner, had. interests sufficiently similar to paying guests in
hotels, motels, and boardinghouses to receive fourth amendment protection. 33 However, nothing in the opinion suggests that daytime guests
in a private home would, without more, gain this protection.
3. Search Incident to Arrest. The most common type of a warrantless_s_earch is the search incident to lawful arrest. 34 The United States
Supreme Court decided three cases in this area.
In Smith v. Ohio, 35 two policemen approached the defendant and
his companion because the police were curious_about the brown paper
bag that the defendant was carrying which was marked "Kash n' Karry"
and "Loaded with Low Prices." Clearly no probable cause existed f~r
an arrest, and the State of Ohio made no Terryl'-type stop-and-frisk
argument. The State conceded that the officers were acting on a mere
hunch. 37 When the defendant was stopped, the defendant threw the bag
on the hood of his car and turned to face the police. The police opened
the bag and discovered illegal paraphernalia. The State argued that this
discovery justified the initial stop. 38 The Supreme Court held 9·0 that
the fruits of a search cannot supply the probable cause for the arrest
to which the search is then incident. 39 Although the Court did not use
terms such as "bootstrap" or '-'circularity," such terms fairly characterize
the argument the State of Ohio relied upon.

28. /d. at 1077 (Brennen, J ~. dissenting).
29. ''Reasonable expectation of privacy•' is the current test for determining whether
police conduct is a ''search.'' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
30. 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990).
31. !d. at 1689-90.
32. I d. at 1687.
33. ld. at 1690.
34. Berner, Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 471,
534 (1974).

35.

110 S. Ct. 1288 (1990).

36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
37. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1289.
38.

39.

/d. at 1290.
/d.
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v~

Buie"J is a significant case concerning the power of
police to '"'sweep" a house incident to arrest. In Buie, two men had
Maryland

just robbed a Godfather's Pizza, and one, was arrested in his home after
fresh pursuit. After securing him, the police walked into the basement
to look for the other perpetrator and found, instead, evidence of defendant's involvement in the crime, a red running suit. The United States
Supreme Court held that, incident to an arrest in a house,. the police
may conduct a "protective sweep" of an area if they possess a "reasonable belief based on specific, articulable facts that the area to be
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest
41
scene. " The Court rejected the ,government's request for an "automatic"
right to make such a sweep incident to all arrests in homes,42 but indicated
in dicta that an automatic right exists to search "closets and other spaces
immediately adjacent to the place of arrest from which an attack could
be immediately launched.. ' ,.43 This innocent sounding sentence likely will
spawn much litigation. Outside this immediate area, however, the Terry
''reasonable suspicion'' standard is required." So long as the police
conduct a proper cursory check of only those places where persons might
be biding, anything that the police observe falls within the ''plain view''
doctrine and is admissible. 4'
New York v. Harris46 raised a subtle question under the "fruit-ofthe-poisonous·tree'' doctrine. 47 Police arrested Harris in his home for
murder. The police had probable cause but no warrant to enter his
home; thus, the arrest violated the fourth amendment under the authority
of Payton v. New York, 48 which requires a warrant to enter a private
home to make an arrest, even though such arrest could be made without
a warrant in any other place:49 After being taken to the station, Harris
made a Mirandized confession. The Supreme Court held 5-4 that the
statement was not tainted by the Payton violation. 50 Unlike an arrest
made without probable cause, the Court reasoned that the custody

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

4S.

110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990).
/d. at 1099-1100.
Id.
•
/d. at 1098.
ld.
See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U ~S. 234 (1968).

110
S.
Ct.
1640
(1990).
.
.
47. This doctrine, which has ·a variety of applications, provides that any product
(such as statements or hard evidence) of prior illegal police behavior is tainted with such
illegality and, thus, excluded. See, .e.g.., Silverthorne Lumber Co., v. United States, 2S l
385 (1920).
48. 44S U :S. 573 (1980).
49. Id. at 600.
.
46.

u.s.

SO. Harris, 110 S .. Ct. at 1644.
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resulting from such arrest is not itself illegal after the arrestee is taken
from his home." The interest invaded is not a liberty interest, but a
privacy interest centered in the home. 52 Indeed, the trial court ruled that
statements Harris made while still in the home were inadmissible.'l After
the suspect is removed from the home, the taint is removed. 54 Of course,
any statement taken after the defendant is removed from the home
would have to comply with the fifth and sixth amendments.''
4. Third-party Consent. Fourth amendment privacy interests can
be lost through consent to search, including consent given by a third
party. 56 The test for determining whether the third party had the power
to give consent is whether the person giving consent had sufficient
dominion and control over the space.'' Illinois v. Rodriguez'8 raises the
interesting problem of consent given by someone the police had every
reason to believe was a co-occupant of the house but who had, in fact,
recently moved from the residence. The Supreme Court held 6~3 that
the consent was operative because police action which is reasonable,
though mistaken, cannot be deterred and need not be remedied. 59 This
case reinforces a critical fourth amendment lesson that the proper perspective from which to judge police conduct is the facts as they appear
to a reasonable police officer.60 When a police officer is reasonably
mistaken, the officer's actions can only be sensibly judged by adopting
the officer's perspective on reality. To judge such actions in light of
facts not accessible to the officer is illogical. The converse is also true.
A police officer who makes an unreasonable search of a house and is
lucky to find contraband cannot defend the action based on the outcome
of the search.
5. Automobile Inventories. Florida v. Well~ 1 is a case whose dicta
is far more important than its holding. The Supreme Court previously
had approved inventory searches of impounded vehicles including a search
of closed containers, provided those searches were "routine" or "stan-

5L /d.
52. /d.
53. /d.
S4. /d.

at
at
at
at

1644-45.
1643.

1642.

1643 (had Harris been arrested on the street. no violation would have

occurred).
55. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment);
Williams, 430 U,S. 387 (1977) (sixth amendment).
See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974).
!d. at 169-72.
110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990).
/d. at 2800.
60. !d. at 2801.
61. 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990).

Brewer v.
56.
51.
58.
59.
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dardized. " 62 In Wells, the police opened a locked suitcase found in the
trunk. The police department had no regulations guiding the officer's
discretion in such matters. The Court held that an inventory without
any guidelines gave too much discretion to police. 63 Guidelines clearly
authorizing the opening of "all" containers, or "no" containers, or
containers specifically described in the regulations would pass muster. 64
The Court suggested that some discretion on which containers to open
may be left to the individual officer, and concluded with this language
that threatens an exception to swallow the rule: It would be "equally
permissible to allow . . . the opening of closed containers whose contents
officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the
container's exteriors. " 6 '
6. Stop and Frisk.-In Alabama v. White, 66 tqe police received an
anonymous tip that the defendant would leave her apartment at a
particular time, enter a particular car, and drive to a particular motel
carrying cocaine in the car. Police staked out her apartment, followed
her as she drove the predicted route, and stopped her as she approached
the motel. The state conceded that this was a Terry stop requiring
"reasonable suspicion. " 67 The Court held that the anonymous tip, though
insufficient to produce probable cause under Illinois v. Gates, 68 nevertheless produced reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. 69
In Molino v. State,'0 the Indiana Supreme Court had occasion to
examine the initial phase of a police-suspect encounter in an airport
setting with a "drug-courier profile," a recurrent situation that has
deeply divided the United States Supreme Court. 71 The defendant, an
Hispanic male, carrying only a leather handbag, "quickly" deplaned in
Indianapolis from a flight originating in Florida, did not claim luggage,
visited the restroom, and walked quickly outside to hail a taxicab. At
this point, three officers, who had been monitoring the defendant,
approached him. One displayed his badge and identification card, identified himself as a narcotics investigator, and inquired if he could ask

62.

428

See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman,
(1976).
Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 .
/d.
ld.
110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990).
During the stop, the defendant consented to a search of the car that produced

u.s. 364

63.
64.
6S.
66.
67.
cocaine.
68.
69.
70.
71.
446 u.s.

462 u.s. 213 (1983).
White, 110 S. Ct. at 2415 .
546 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989).
See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall,
544 (1980).

HeinOnline -- 24 Ind. L. Rev. 730 1990-1 99 1
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several questions, to which the defendant consented. The defendant
showed his identification and airline ticket which were unremarkable,
and stated that he was a clothing buyer. The officer then asked if he
could look inside the handbag. The defendant indicated agreement.
During this search, the defendant exhibited nervousness. When asked if
the defendant would consent to a search of his person, he responded,
"I have drugs. " 72 From this point on, the police followed all proper
procedures. The defendant was convicted for possession of cocaine with
intent to deliver.
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 3-2, in an
opinion written by Justice Givan. 73 The opinion leaves some doubt as
to which of these two rationales is the decisive one: (a) the defendant
had not been ''seized'' at the point he made the incriminating response;
or (b) he had been "seized," but the seizure was proper under the stop..
and-frisk doctrine. The Indiana Supreme Court cited United States v.
14
Mendenha//, a case remarkably similar on the facts, for the proposition
that such questioning in an airport is not a seizure. 7' Only two justices,
however, joined in that portion of the Mendenhall opinion, and later
cases evidence a tendency of the United States Supreme Court to treat
such confrontations as seizures. 76
Molino is more tractable to a "no seizure" solution than cases like
Florida v. Royer'' in which the defendant was escorted by airport police
to an interrogation room. In Molino, the interrogation and searches
took place on an airport sidewalk. Even so, it is difficult to imagine
that someone who is approached as Molino was by the three narcotics
officers would, in any objective sense, feel "free to go," which is the
acknowledged test for lack of a seizure.78 Indeed, when the police asked
for his "consent" to a personal search, Molino responded, "I have
drugs. " 79 This does not sound like the response of someone who believes
he is in a friendly conversation from which he can leave at will.
Molino can be more fairly interpreted as resting on a finding that
there existed reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Indiana Supreme
Court stated: "The police officers were merely in a 'stop and frisk'
situation at the time appellant volunteered the information that he was
carrying drugs. ''80 The dissenting opinions of Justices DeBruler and
72. Molino, S46 N.E.2d at 1217.
73. ld. at 1219.
74. 446 u.s. 544 (1980).
75. Molino, 546 N.E.2d at 1220.
76. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
77. 460 u.s. 491 (1983).
78. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
79. Molino, 546 N.E.2d at 1217.
80. /d. at 1219 .
•

•
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Dickson argue that the sparse facts of this case, even if they might be
. properly combined with other facts under a drug-courier profile, are
simply not enough to produce reasonable suspicion.81
If the court based its decision on a finding of reasonable suspicion,
re.cent United States. Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the Court's
willingness to find that reasonable suspicion is present on fewer facts
than in the past. The facts in United States v. Sokolow"2 are somewhat
stronger than in. Molino, and perhaps decisively s.o .83 The finding of
reasonable suspicion in Sokolow was not, as the Molino court intimated,
because of the drug-courier profile, but in spite of it. 84 The primary
difficulty with the Molin.o opinion is that it does not attempt to make
a case for reasonable suspicion based on the facts before it. The opinion
addresses primarily the "no seizure" issue and then the events that occur
after the incriminating response which were not an issue in the case.
In Molino, the Indiana Supreme Court gave little justification for its
stated holding.
7. Warrants. Indiana Code section 35-33-5-8 provides that affidavits in support of search or arrest warrants now may be forwarded
to the judge by facsimile transmission (FAX), and that the warrants
may be returned by similar transmission.-85 This provision undoubtedly
will save valuable time in situations in which time is of the essence-.
One ponders whether this will lead courts in close cases to be more
insistent on the use of warrants because warrants now will be obtainable
with less delay .
8. Drunk-Driving Roadblocks. In a long-awaited decision, the
United States Supreme Court in Michigan Department of State Police
v. Sitz, 86 upheld (6-3) police roadblocks to monitor drivers for driving
under the influence. 87 The Court .employed the administrative-search
balancing process by weighing the government's ''special need'' against
the privacy loss resulting from the particular .intrusion involved. 88 Statistics
and other evidence of the mayhem caused by drunk drivers were found
to outweigh the relatively minimal intrusion involved in such stops. 89

81. /d. at 1220 (DeBruler. J ., dissenting); id. at 1221 (Dickson, J ., dissenting).
82. 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989).
83. In Sokolow, the defendant paid $2,100 for two round trip tickets from a roll
of $20 bills; he traveled under a name that did not match his telephone number; his
original destination was Miami. where he stayed for only 48 hours; he appeared nervous;
and he checked none of his lu~age.
84. Id. at 1587.
85. bm. CoDE § 35-33-S-8 (Supp. 1990).
86. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990).
87. /d. at 2488.
88. Id. at 2485.
89~ Id. at 2486.
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The Court addressed only the issue regarding the initial check of all
drivers, and left questions concerning how much evidence justifies longer,
more intrusive procedures for other cases. 90 Justice Stevens's dissent is
intriguing. He would disallow random, unannounced roadblocks, but
would permit regular, fixed, and anticipatable intrusions such as metal
detectors at all subway entrances and breathalyzer checks at all toll-road
entrances. 91
9. The Plain- View Doctrine.-Horton v. Californian put to rest
the mysterious "inadvertence" requirement of the plain-view doctrine93
by holding 7-2 that the fourth amendment does not require "inadvertence" during plain-view searches. 94 Thus, if the police have probable
cause that a house contains a gun and illegal drugs, and obtain a warrant
specifying only the gun, any drugs found during the search will be
admissible under the plain-view doctrine provided that (1) the police
were looking only in places where the gun could be found,· and that
(2) the police had not yet found the gun. 9' The Court points out that
police have little incentive to omit items from warrant applications because
each listed item will expand and never contract the scope of the search. 96

B.

Police Interrogation

The case of Pennsylvania v. Muniz91 serves as a useful review of
many well-established Miranda exceptions with only one new development. In Muniz, the defendant was arrested for drunk driving and was
taken to the police station. He was asked a series of biographical questions
(name, age, address, etc.) which he answered with slurred speech. The
police videotaped a series of sobriety tests that the defendant failed
miserably. The defendant was asked if he would take a breathalyzer
test. He responded with a series of spontaneous admissions. When asked
the calendar date of his sixth birthday, the defendant did not respond
correctly. The defendant was not Mirandized.
The Supreme Court stated that the biographical questions, though
conceded to be "custodial interrogation," were exempt from Miranda

90.
91.
92.
93.
not seize
403 u.s.
94.
9S.
96.
97.

/d. at 2485.
/d. at 2497-98 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
This requirement, which states that under the plain-view doctrine, police may
those things they anticipated finding, stems from Coolidge v. New Hampshire,
443 (1971).
Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304.
Id. at 2309.
/d. at 2304-10.
110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990).
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under the "routine booking_question" exception.98 The defendant's behavior and slurred spe.ech were outside Miranda because they were not
''testimonial'' or ''communicative,'' but were instead physical evidence
of the defendant's body motion and speech similar to voice and handwriting exemplars which have been long understood to be outside the
fifth amendment. 99 The spontaneous statements falling within what many
courts call the "blurting out;, doctrine were- admissible because they
were not the product of "custodial interrogation!' 100 One of the more
common misconceptions is that Miranda warnings are required in all
arrests~ The rule is only that such warnings must be given if custodial
interrogation is to follow .101 All of these holdings are quite consistent
with past cases.l02
In Muniz, the Court held, however, that the answer to the ''sixth
birthday" question should have been suppressed . 103 Even though the
prosecution argued that it only wanted the answer to show slurred speech
and impaired mental activity, the Court held that the ''content'' of the
answer was implicated, 104 and thus the answer was excluded from the
voice-handwriting exemplar exception. 105 This holding leaves some questions unresolved. What would the Court hold if the question called for
some mental acuity, for example, adding three-digit numbers in the head,
but did not involve any of the suspect's biographical history? Would
this example just be a different kind of field sobriety test?
In Illinois v. Perkins, 106 police placed an undercover agent, posing
as an inmate, in the defendant's cell. The agent encouraged the defendant
to talk about the crime, and the defendant gave a series of incriminating
responses. 107 The Court held that Miranda did not apply because the
coercion with which Miran-da is concerned was not involved. 108 Until the
defendant thinks he is being interrogated by a policeman, the ''inherent
c_ompulsion" is absent. 109 However, had formal judicial proceedings al98. Id. at 2650.
99. /d. ~t 2644-45. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (suspect
can be compelled to participate in a lineup).
100. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
101. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-79 (1966).
102. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); United States v. Dionisio,
410 U.S. I (1973).
103. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2646.
104. /d.
105. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplars): United
States v. Mara, 410 U;S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplars).
106. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990).
107. Miranda warnings, of course, were not given as this tends seriously to undermine
the ruse.
108. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397•98.
109. /d.
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ready begun, the sixth amendment would have prohibited this police
conduct. 110 Once again, the Rehnquist Court takes a different view of
the fifth amendment Miranda protection from its sixth amendment protection against custodial interrogation emanating from the assistance-ofcounsel clause.
The Court previously has_ held that under both the fifth and sixth
amendments,_ once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, interrogation
must cease and may not begin again unles-s initiated by the suspect. 111
In Michigan v. Harvey, 112 the- Court held S-4 that statements taken in
violation of this rule may be used, without offending either amendment,
to impeach the trial testimony of a defendant provided that the statement
is given voluntarily. 113· The dissent pointed out, however,- that under this
case, after a suspect invokes counsel, there is little to deter police from
continuing the interrogation because the defendant will rarely initiate
further questions or cooperate after he has spoken with a lawyer.l 14 The
rationale for the majority's decision, as in cases of using nonMirandized
statements to impeach,··~ is to discourage perjury. 116
James v. Illinoisu' is an intriguing case which produced a surprisingly
close S-4 vote with Justice Brennan voting with the majority. In James,
the defendant was arrested for murder and attempted murder. The arrest,
as conceded by the State, was illegal. 118 The defendant, whose hair was
short and black upon arrest, made the incriminating statement under
police interrogation that his hair had been long and reddish-brown at
the time of the incident and that he had cut it and dyed it to alter his
appearance. Because this confession was the product of an unlawful
arrest, the trial court suppressed, it as fruit of the poisonous tree, a
ruling that the State did not appeal. Under Harris v. New York, 119 thestatement nevertheless would have been available to impeach the defendant if he testified inconsistently. 120 Prosecution eyewitnesses testified
that the perpetrator they identified at the trial had reddish-brown long
hair. During the defendant's case-in-chief, the defendant called his close
friend who testified that on the day of the shooting, the defendant's
hair was short and black. The defendant's statement was then introduced

•

110. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980).
111. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
112. 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990).
113. /d. at 1179.
114. /d. at 1188 (Stevens, J ., dissenting).
liS. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971).
116. Harvey. 110 S. Ct. at 1180.
117. 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990).
t 18. /d. at 6SO.
119. 401 u.s. 222 (1971).
120. /d. at 225.
'
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by the prosecution solely to impeach the testimony of this witness.
Conceding that the use of the defendant's statement to impeach the
defendant's trial testimony, had he testified, would be proper under
Harris, the Supreme Court held that the statement may not be used to
121
impeach other defense witnesses. The Court reasoned that the risk of
a perjury prosecution is a much more powerful deterrent to someone
not already on trial for serious crime. 122 The dissent asserted that Harris
should be extended to embrace impeaching defense witnesses other than
the defendant, especially those closely associated with the defendant, to
123
deter the defendant from maneuvering his way around Harris.
Although both the majority and the dissent addressed the question
i~ only a cursory way, classic understanding of evidence is that the
refutation of one•s statement with that of another is .not, strictly speaking,
sincerity impeachment. 124 If one person asserts mutually inconsistent
statements, his credibility is necessarily called into question. If A says
''red'' at one time and ''not red;' at another; he cannot be telling the
truth all the time. If, however, A says "red'' and B says "not red,"
they cannot both be right, but one cannot determine whose credibility
is necessarily called into question.
.

.

C.

Discovery

In Indiana, discovery rights were expanded in Hicks v. State12' to
permit pretrial discovery of verbatim witness statements notwithstanding
the claim that such statements were: work product. 126 This holding over~
rules Spears v. State. 121 The primary rationale offered by the Hicks court
to -support the ruling was that verbatim witness statements must be
viewed as potential substantive evidence under the rule of Patterson v.
State.128 Pursuing this logic, the court analogized verbatim witness statements to other exhibits such as photographs,: videotapes, handwriting
examples, diagrants, and other physical evidence; the discoverability of
such similar physical evidence is unquestioned, even if prepared by
counsel. ' 29 The court perceived that discovery of these statements, like

121. James, 110 S. Ct. at 652, 656.
122. Id. at 653.
123. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
124. E. Cu!A.aY,. McCOllMICK ON EVIDBNCB § 47 (3d ed. 1984).
125. 544 N.E.2d SOO (Ind. 1989).
126. /d. at S04.
127. ld. See Spears v. State, 272 Ind. 647, 403 N .. E.2d 828 (1980).
128. Hiclcs, 544 ·N.E.2d at S04. See Patterson v. State. 263 Ind. ss. 324 N.E.2d
482 (1975) (court -permits the substantive use of prior statements of a witness who testifies

and is available for cross-examination).
129. Hicks, S44 N.E.ld at S04.
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discovery of other physical evidence, would improve the efficiency of
the criminal justice system. 130 The culmination of this reasoning was the
rejection of the work product doctrine as a shield to discovery . 131 The
court appeared to question whether such statements are protectable work
product by observing that the "essential function of the work ·product
exception is to protect from disclosure an attorney's 'mental impressions,
conclusions; opinions or legal theories."' 132 The court probably does not
believe that a verbatim witness statement falls within this definition.
The distinction between the two rationales is important. If Hicks
means that such statements are work product, but discoverable, because
the statement may be offered as substantive evidence under Patterson, 133
the parties' failure to designate the declarant of the statement as a
potential witness could thwart pretrial discovery of the statement. This
would result because submission of the statement as substantive evidence
under Patterson would require the declarant to testify at trial. 134 If the
declarant does not testify, the statement could not be admitted as substantive evidence. 135 Alternatively, if these .s tatements are not work product, the ability to discover such statements would not be affected · by
the party's designation of potential witnesses. 1 ~6
The breadth of the Hicks rule was demonstrated in Crawford v.
Superior Court of Lake County. 131 In Crawford, the trial court directed

Id.
/d.
132. /d. (quoting Trial Rule IND. R. TRIAL P. 26(B)(3) (1990).
133. 263 Ind. 55; 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975) .
•
134. Id. at 58, 324 N .. E.2d at 484.
135. See Watkins v. State, 446 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1983).
136. Verbatim witness statements should be discoverable- without regard to whether
the State intends to call the relator-witness. The purpose of discovery is to promote truthfinding; it is not limited to detennining the nature of the adversary's case. M·oreover, a
prosecutor is not a typical adversary. The prosecutor will have more resources available
for preparation than will the ordinary defendant. A prosecutor is also atypical in that
prosecutors are charged, in theory~. with obtaining a fair result. Truth~finding and the
likelihood of a fair result are enhanced if the stronger ~dversary, the prosecutor, is
.obligated to tender all relevant evidence.
137. 549 N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 1990). Crawford sheds some light on the exact basis of
the earlier Hicks holding. The court in Crawford noted that the State's act of listing
potential witnesses was a sufficient basis for assuming the witnesses would testify and
that their prior statements would be relevant. Id. at 375·76. This analysis is necessary
only if Hicks is predicated on the assumption that witnesses'' statements are work product
but are not protected because they may become substantive evidence if the witness testifies.
Nevertheless, doubt remains because the trial court order that was affirmed in Crawford
directed the State to produce :all "statements by Witnesses to police officers . . . . " /d.
at 375. The opinion does not suggest that this particular order was confined to the
statements of witnesses that the State intended to call at trial, although the trial court's
first discovery order was so limited. /d. at 376.
130.
131.

•
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the State to produce statements made by witnesses to police officers
which had been reduced to writing in police reports. 138 The State objected
on the ground that police reports are protected work product under
State ex rei. Keaton v. Circuit Court of Rush County. 139 The court
rejected the argument, and ruled that statements which purport to be
the words of the witness reduced to writing as the witness spoke or
shortly thereafter are discoverable even if they are contained in a police
report. 140 If a police officer's opinions, impressions, and theories are
interspersed with witness statements, an in-camera inspection by the trial
court should be utilized to determine whether the document is essentially
a witness statement or a privileged report. 141
A trial court's failure to conduct an in-camera review required reversal
in H14/ett v. State. 142 Hulett was charged with child molesting. Prior to
the alleged incident, the child had received counseling in -relation to her
parents' divorce. The defendant sought discovery of the counselor's file
of the child. The trial court initially indicated it would conduct an incamera review, but failed to do so. Thereafter, the trial court ruled that
the file was not discoverable on the grounds that the material was
privileged and irrelevant, and that its tender would be oppressive and
burdensome. 143 The child testified at trial, and Hulett was convicted.
The court of appeals declined to create a general counselor-patient
privilege, and found that the file was unprotected in this regard. 144 The
court also found that any ruling on relevancy was speculative because
only the counselor knew the contents of the file. 145 Because the file
could contain evidence of prior false accusations or inconsistent statements bearing on the credibility of the testifying child, an in-camera
inspection by the trial court was required. 146 Without such an inspection,
the presence or absence of discoverable information could not be ascertained. Thus, failure to conduct an in-camera inspection was reversible
error.

138. Crawford, 549 N.E.2d at 375.
139. /d. at 376. See State ex rei. Keaton v. Circuit Court of Rush County, 475
N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 1985).
140. Crawford. S44 N.E.2d at 376.
141. ld.
142. SS2 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
143. /d. at 48.
144. Id. at 49.
145. /d.
146. ld. The claim that tendering the file was unduly burdensome because of the
need to excise references to individuals other than the child was deemed to relate more
to the relevancy inquiry than to the claim of burdensomene$s. ld. at 50. The claim that
the request was burdensome was only addressed in this context.
•
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D. Double Jeopardy
The United States Supreme Court decided two double jeopardy cases
last term. Each is surprising, important, and likely to prompt a flood
of cases in refinement.
The first, Grady v. Corbin, 147 is arguably the year's blockbuster for
the- practicing criminal justice professional. Justice Brennan wrote for
the majority in this S-4 decision; thus, its longevity is in serious question.;
After an automobile collision, the defendant was ticketed for driving
under the influence (D.U.I.) and for crossing the center line, which are
crimes under New York state law. An occupant in the other car died
shortly thereafter. Through tragic noncommunication, the . pros-e cutors
working on the traffic tickets were unaware of the fatality and the
pendency of a homicide prosecution. The defendant pleaded guilty to
D.U.I. and crossing the center line, and then sought to prohibit his
prosecution for ''reckless manslaughter'' on double-jeopardy grounds. 148
The bill of particulars in the homicide prosecution showe_d that the
prosecution would attempt to prove recklessness through (1) D.U.I., (2)
crossing the center line, and (3) driving too fast for conditions. The
Court held that the reckless manslaughter pros_
ecution was barred unless
the prosecutor first amended the bill of particulars to rely solely upon
driving too fast for conditions, 149 The prosecutor cannot, in any retrial,
attempt to prove conduct that is either D.U.I. or crossing the center

line.u.o
This decision marks a radical departure from existing doctrine. The
Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States151 held that offenses are
not the "same, for double-jeopardy purposes if each requires proof of
a material element that the other does not. 1' 2 Thus, if offenses are
identical or one is a lesser-included offense of the other, conviction for
both is improper. Clearly, the prosecution in this case is not barred by
Blockburger because D.U.I. and crossing the center line can be committed
without a death ensuing and involuntary manslaughter can occur without
the commission of these particular traffic offenses.
Likewise, if the government had lost on a factual element common
to the second case, the ''collateral estoppel'' extension of double jeopardy
•

147.
148.
lndiana,s
149.
150.
151.
152.

110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990).
/d. at 2086. The New York reckless manslaughter statute is equivalent to
reckless homicide statute. IND. CoDE § 3542-1·5 (1988).
Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2086.
/d. at 2094.
284 u.s., 299 (1932).
/d. at 304.

l
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would bar the seco,n d trial. 153 In the case at bar, however, the government
won the earlier case.
The Court, in a striking extension of the reach of the double jeopardy
clause, adopted dicta in Illinois v. Vitale,ts4 and held as follows:
As we suggested in Vitale, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any
subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an
essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant
has already been prosecuted. This is not an ''actual evidence''
or "same evidence" test. The critical inquiry is what condu~t
the state will prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove
that conduct. 1ss
Note that the homicide prosecution is not based on a theory that the
killing was committed during the perpetration of an unlawful act, a
theory which would require the State to prove the unlawful act as an
essential element of the current charge. 156 Such would be parallel to
convicting the defendant first for arson and then prosecuting the defendant for felony murder based on arson, a scenario clearly barred
under Harris v. Ok/ahom_a. 151 The homicide theory in Grady was recklessness, not unlawful act;_ recklessness may occasion the proof of unlawful acts such as D.U.I., but it does not require it. 158 These acts of
recklessness happen to be crimes themselves, but the theory of recklessness
does not require proof that the underlying activity is an independent
crime. 159 For these reasons, the Grady holding extended double jeopardy
protection well beyond its previous boundaries_.
The Grady court's holding does not quite extend double jeopardy
to embrace the civil notion of compulsory joinder, but it has moved a
great distance in that direction. Until this decision is given more definition, prosecutors must be vigilant not to permit any charges to go to
trial or plea if any part of the conduct covered thereby will form part
of the factual content of any subsequent criminal proceeding. 160
153. Ashe v. S_wenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970).
154. 447 u.s. 410 (l980).
ISS. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2093.
156. This would be the case in Indiana if prosecution were brought under Involuntary
Manslaughter, IND. CODE § 35-42-1-4 (198_8), but not true under Reckless Homicide,- IND.
CoDE § 35-42-1-5 (1988).
157. 433 u.s. 682 (1977).
158. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094.
159~ See IND.- CoDE § 35-42-1-5 (1988).
160. Prosecutors will have to be careful that proof in any trial will not foreclose
an opportunity to try other charges arising out of the same conduct, whether currently
charged or not. Fear of a Grady foreclosure of later prosecutions may amount to a de
facta compulsory joinder regime. If the defendant successfully moves for a severance of
counts,_presumably this will constitute -a waiver of the Grady protection.
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The other 1989 Supreme Court double jeopardy decision was Dowling
v. United States. 161 In Dowling, the defendant was tried for the first
robbery (Robbery '1) and acquitted. The defendant was then tried for
the_ se_
cond robbery (Robbery 2). At the second trial, the Government
called a witness to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of Robbery
1, an identification the Court assumed would otherwise fit under the
162
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) exception to character evidence. The
defendant conceded admissibility under Rule 404(b), but claimed that
any reference to his identity in Robbery 1 was barred by double jeopardy
because it would force him, in effect; to relitigate issues on which he
had already prevailed. 163 The Court held 6-3 that there was no consti..
tutional violation, and that this identification testimony was admissible. 164
Relying on a subtle distinction in the applicable burdens of proof, the
Court noted that the first trial demonstrated only that the defendant
was not identified as the perpetrator in Robbery 1 beyond a reasonable
doubt-. 16$ The standard for Rule-404(b) evidence of other crimes, however,
is only a preponderance of the evidence under Huddleston v. United
States.t 66- Because the Robbery 2 trial court found by a preponderance
that the defendant committed Robbery l, the prior acquittal did not
167
bar the testimony . Thus, past s_pecific instances of misconduct that
have been litigated to acquittal stand on the same footing as those that
have not yet been litigated. If the prosecution can persuade the trial
court by a preponderance of the evidence that such crimes occurred,
they are admissible if they fit the Rule 404(b) exception to character
evidence. 168
The dissent raised an interesting question: If the standard of proof
for sentencing purposes of past misconduct including crimes is less than
beyond a reasonable doubt as it typically is, could a prior acquittal be
used to enhance a sentence? 169 There are Indiana cases to the contrary, 170
but they are prior to Dowling. 111

161. 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990).
162. Indiana courts recognize the 404(b) exception to character evidence. See 12 R.
Mn,I.ER, INDIANA EVIDENCE 26S-94 (1984), which describes the admissibility of prior _
acts
to prove intent, motive, kno_wledge, malice, sanity, scheme or plan, capacity to commit
offense, identity, and depraved sexual instinct.
163. Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 672.
164. Id. at 61S.
I6S. Id. at 672-73.
166.
167.
168.

485

u.s.

681 (1988).
Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 673.

/d.
169. /d. at 680 (Brennen, J ., dissenting).
170. See, e.g., McNew v. State, 271 Ind. 214, 391 N.E.2d 607 (1979).
171.. See infra § lli(H).
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ln Tyson v. State, 112 the Fourth District Court of Appeals confronted
a vexing manifest-necessity scenario. 173 The defendant's trial for burglary
and theft had commenced (hence, jeopardy had attached), and unexpectedly a critical prosecution witness who was under subpoena vanished.
The prosecution moved for a mistrial, which the court granted over the
defendant's objection. The defendant was convicted at a subsequent trial
after having properly preserved his double jeopardy challenge. 174
The question presented was whether the absence of the witness was
''manifest necessity'' so as to permit a second trial after a mistrial of
175
the first. The majority held that it was not manifest necessity because
once having subjected defendant to jeopardy, the state was bound to
see the case to conclusion even if its witnesses became unavailable~ 176
The dissent, while recognizing that the majority'-s position would be true
as a general rule, noted that the combination of the following factors
should have led to a different result in this_case: (1) the witness had
been served with subpoena; (2) the witness drove the getaway car; (3)
the witness was the only one who saw the defendant at scene; (4) the
witness had an ongoing friendship with the defendant; and (5) this
friendship appeared to be the reason for her absconding~ 171 Thus, the
dissent argued, applying the double jeopardy bar in this case placed an
unfair burden on the State. 178
This issue is a difficult one~ It seems harsh to charge either the
prosecution or the defendant with the witness's absconding in the absence
of proof of connivance. Presumably, if the State could show that the
defendant participated in the disappearance, no constitutional violation
could be shown. 179 Nor will it ordinarily be clear that a mistrial will
help the prosecution; after all, if th,e witness runs away out of friendship
for the defendant, why should one assume that, once discovered, her
testimony will be what the State hopes? 180 In the first trial, the prosecution

172. 543 N.E.ld 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
173. "M.mfest necessity,. is a doctrine permitting retrial after a mistrial caused
through no egregious fault of the prosecution. See IND. CooE § 35-41-4-3 (1988).
174. The appellate record does not indicate whether this critical witness testified at
the second trial, a rather astounding omission.
175. The manifest necessity exception to double_jeopardy is codified in IND. CooE
§ lS-41-4-3 (1988).
f76. Tyson. S43 N.E.2d at 419-20.
177. ld. at 420 (Chezum. J., dissenting).
178. ld.
179. ld.
l80. Of course, in this case, the appellate court addressed the question after the
second trial, though the record does not tell the reader whether the absent witness testified
and, if so, how. Ordinarily, however, double-jeopardy challenges precede the second trial
because being forced to undergo the second trial is part of what the clause protects against.
f
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had called other witnesses and presumably could have let the case proceed
to jury determination. The majority's fear was that prosecutors will
begin to use "manifest necessity" when their evidence is not evolving
as strongly as it might in a later trial. 181 If the missing witness cannot
be shown to be critically important, this fear becomes more realistic.

E.

Confrontation

The United States Supreme Court decided two confrontation cases
last term, each arising from the tension between the defendant's sixth
amendment confrontation interests, the cross-examination interest and
the face-to-face interest, and the state's need for the testimony of minor
children in sexual abuse cases._The Court rejected an attempt to introduce
a child's hearsay statement through a relator, thus maintaining the
strength of the cross-examination interest, 182 but permitted cross-examined
testimony of a child witness separated from the courtroom, thus weakening the face-to-face interest.~ 83
In Idaho v. Wright, 184 the trial court permitted a physician to relate
the statements of a two-and-a-half-year-old child. It had been determined
that the child could not possibly give meaningful testimony at ttial._•ss
Though conceding that the- testimony included he.~say, the trial court
found that the child's statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability to
fit the Idaho "residual" or "catch-all" exception, the functional equiv186
alent of Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (24); and therefore rejected the
defendant's confrontation claim.
The Supreme Court began by assuming that the child was unavailable,
thus paving the way for a hearsay admission, but held that under the
confrontation clause, indicia of reliability were insuffieient to admit the
evidence. 187 Indeed, as the Court noted, there are many reasons to be-

181. Tyson, 543 N.E.2d at 419.
182. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
183. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
184. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
185. ld. at 3141.
186. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence noted that the historical development of hearsay exceptions was often frustrated by cases in which everyone appreciated
the high trustworthiness of given hearsay, but could not fit it within an existing "pigeonhole.'' Often, to .admit the evidence. courts would expand the most appropriate
pigeonhole. Over time, this had the effect of creating exceptions that would accommodate
hearsay that was not at all trustworthy. "Hard cases_make bad law." To avoid a repeat
of this process, the drafters inserted a ''residual" exception to hearsay. See FED. R. Evm.
803(24) and 804(b)(5). Under these rubrics, the court can admit highly trustworthy hearsay
without destroying the integrity of the other historical exceptions.
l87. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3152 .
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particularly suspicious of these statements in sexual abuse cases. 188· Thus,
the Court affirmed the· state supreme court's reversal of the conviction. 189
The opinion reaffirmed that if a statement fits a "firmly rooted" exception to the hearsay rule, it will pass muster under the confrontation
clause. 190 However, cases under the "residual" exception must be monitored on a case-by-case basis for sufficient indicia of reliability to meet
a confrontation challenge. 191

Maryland v. Craig19'J. began the refinement of the face-to-face pro..,
tection of Coy v._ Iowa. 193 If the trial court determines, in. an individual
case, that testimony in the courtroom will cause a child witness to suffer
serious emotional ·distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate, the trial court may arrange a closed-circuit process that separates the child from the courtroom. 194 Craig suggests that the method
used in this case is permissible, though other methods may also be
permissible. 19' Here the witness, prosecutor.. and defense counsel were
in a separate room, all viewable by judge, jury, and defendant, and the
defendant was in direct audio contact with his attorney. The child could
not see the defendant or others in the courtroom. The Supreme Court.
pointed o.ut that there had been a particularized holding by the trial
court that the child's view of the defendant would have caused trauma.
If, however, a trial court should find that the problem is not the presence·
of the defendant, but rather the general counroom setting, the defendant
should join the others in the separate room to give the fullest protection
to the defendant's face-to-face interest.t96
The Indiana Court of Appeals for the First District had occasion
to review the "face-to-face" aspect of confrontation in Casada v. State. 197
Defendant, the step-father of the alleged victim, E.T., was convicted of
two counts of attempted child molesting, a class C felony .198 At the
trial, thirteen-year-old E.T . 199 became so distraught on the stand that
she could not respond to the first question asked on direct examination
by the prosec.ution. After a short recess, the trial court ordered a six..
foot by four-foot chalkboard to be placed betweell the witness and the
188. Jd. at 31St.
189. Id. at 31S3.
190. See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986).'
l91. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3152.
1'92. 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990).
193. 487
1012 (1.988).
194. Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170.
195. /d. at 3.167-68.

u.s.

196. Id. at 3169.
197. S44 N.E.2d 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
198. IND. CODE § 3S-42-4-3(c) (1988).
199.. She was 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident.
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defendant in an attempt to decrease the witness's anxiety. She was then
able to give testimony; indeed, the chalkboard was removed during cross
and redirect examination.
In a carefully reasoned opinion, Judge Ratliff first reviewed the
history of the confrontation clauses of the United States and Indiana
constitutions with particular attention to the recently re. .emerging emphasis on face-to-face viewing. 200 The opinion notes that for witnesses
under ten years of age, the legislature has provided some guidance in
this area. 201 These provisions did not apply to the case at bar due to
the witness's age. In any event, the statutes were not intended as the
exclusive word on the subject, and a trial court is free to fashion other
remedies to balance the government's legitimate interests (including the
development of testimony) against the defendant's interests in a faceto-face encounter.202 The core of the holding is_that a witness's
mere
.
nervousness or temporary inability to testify is not, without further
inquiry, sufficient to overcome the defendant's strong constitutional
interests.203 A chalkboard or other suitable barrier can, in an appropriate
case, be a permissible technique;. however, the trial court in this case
had exanlined no witnesses to determine if the witness would or would
not be able to reasonably communicate without such apparatus. Either
further inquiry or' less drastic means, such as a recess to per1nit the
witness to collect composure, should have preceded the use of the
barrier. 204
.

'

F. Scientific Evidence
Although this Article does not embrace the discipline of ''evidence,''
no criminal law survey could be complete without noting that Indiana
has joined the growing list of states that have, by statute, accepted
forensic DNA205 analysis as sufficiently scientific for use in court. 206
G.
1.

Trial

Jury Selection. During his state court trial, a white defendant

objected to the prosecutor's use of two peremptory challenges to strike

200.

Caada, S44 N.E.2d at 189.

See also Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988)

(the leading case on the sixth-amendment application); Miller v. State, S3l N.E.2d 466
(1988) (the leading case on article I, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution).
201. IND. CODB §§ 35-]7,4 6 and 35-37-4-8 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
202. Casada, 544 N.E.2d at 196.
203. ld.
204. /d.
205.
206.

Deoxyribonucleic Acid.
IND. Coos § 35-37-4-10 {Supp. 1990).
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the only two blacks· on the venire panel from the petit jury. In Holland
v. lllinois, 201 Holland, the defendant, preserved both the sixth amendment
fair cross-section claim and the equal protection claim in the Illinois
state courts. Unfortunately, Holland pursued only the fair cross-section
claim before the United States Supreme· Court.
Because every defendant has a sixth amendment right to a venire
designed to provide a fair cross-section of the community, the Court
concluded that Holland had standing to raise the sixth amendment claim
even though he was not a member of a systematically excluded group. 208
Nevertheless,. the Court rejected the claim on the merits. The Court
adhered to its ruling in Lockhard v. McCree'-09 that the fair cross-section
requirement applies only to the venire panel and not to the petit jury.210
The fair cross..section requirement was viewed as a .means of assuring
an impartial jury, not a representative jury.211 To this end, the fair crosssection requires that the venire stage can be disrupted at the petit jury
stage to serve the State's legitimate interest in obtaining an impartial
jury.212 The State, therefore, may use peremptory challenges to eliminate
jurors belonging. to groups it believes would unduly favor the other side.
The fair cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment is not
offended by such conduct even if the strikes are· based on racial groupings
because (1) the fair cross-section requirement applies to the venire panel
and not to petit juries and (2) disrupting the cross-section provided by
213
the venire is often necessary to secure an impartial jury. Indeed, the
Court indicated that the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury
would be impaired, if not lost, by any rule requiring that the ·petit jury
reflect a fair cross. .section of the community.214 Holland v. Illinois explicitly holds that although use of peremptory challenges based on race
may violate the equal protection clause,. it does not violate the sixth
amendment's fair cross-section requirement. 2u
The more~ interesting aspect of Holland is Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in the S-4 decision. Justice Kennedy noted that the
decision does not alter the rule that exclusion of jurors, based on race,
violates the equal protection clause. 216 Justice Kennedy also stated that
'

•

207.
208.

110 S. Ct. 803 (1990).
/d. at 805.

209. 476 u.s. 162 (1986).
210. Holland~ 110 S. Ct., at 806 (citing Lockhard v. McCreet 476 U.S. 162, 174
(1986)).
211.

Id. at 807.
212. ld. at 809.
213. Id. at 808..
214. /d.
215. Id. at 806.
216. /d. at 811 (Kennedy, J ., concurring) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986)).
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a white defendant would have standing to raise the claim. 217 Coupled
with the four dissenters, Justice Kennedy would have been the fifth vote
to find the equal protection claim available to any defendant. Thus,
Holland would have been deemed to have standing on the equal protection
claim had he pursued it. However, because one of the dissenters, Justice
Brennan, has retired, the ultimate resolution of this particular standing
question remains unclear.
The language in Holland regarding standing on the equal protection
claim raises questions regarding the viability of the Indiana case law
dealing with Batson issues. Batson issues also were addressed most
recently by the Indiana Supreme Court in Minniefield v. State. 218 In
Minniefield, two black defendants were tried on robbery charges. The
State's evidence included a slip of paper taken from the victim's pocket
which was recovered during a search of one of the defendants. Racist
jokes were written on the paper. It appeared that the source of the
racist jokes was the victim. As a .matter of strategy, the. State used six
peremptory challenges to strike one white and five black prospective
jurors, leaving a petit jury of one black and eleven white persons. The
defense objecte.d based on .Batson v. Kentucky} 19
On appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, the convictions were
reversed. 220 The court ruled that to establish a denial of equal protection,
a defendant must show the following: (1) He is a member of a cognizable
racial group; (2) the prosecutor peremptorily challenged members of the
defendant's race; and (3) the circumstances raise an inference that the
prosecutor excluded veniremen because of their race. 221 Once a defendant
demonstrates as much, the State must provide a neutral explanation. 222
In Minniefield, the defendants clearly offered circumstances that
raised the inference that the prosecution excluded jurors based on race.
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected strategic grounds as a neutral
explanation.223 Likewise, the court rejected the State's claim that the
challenges were not based on the jurors' "racial" identity with the
defendant. 2:M The majority found that the use of peremptory challenges
based on race is a per se violation of the equal protection clause.m
217. Id. at 811-:12 (Kennedy, J .• concurring).
218. 539 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 1989). Minniefield was discussed in last year's survey
article. See Kammen & Polito, Criminal Low and Procedure. Survey of Recent Developments
in Indiana Law, 22 IND. L .. REv. 303 (1990).
219. 476
79 (1986).
220. Minniefield, 539 N.E.2d at 467.
221. /d. at 466.
222. /d.
223. Id~
224. /d.

u.s.

225.

/d.
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The viability of the Minniefield requirement that the challenged jurors
be members of the defendant's race is questionable. Again, the Holland
opinion demonstrated the existence of five votes that would hold that
all defendants have standing to challenge the exclusion of jurors based
on race on equal protection grounds.226 Four members of the majority
in Holland did not express their views on the issue. At worst, Justice
Brennan',s retirement means the vote would be 4-4 leaving the Court-'s
newest member, Justice Souter, in the tie-breaker position. Accordingly,
all defendants should preserve the Batson issue, if it arises during jury
selection, notwithstanding the Minniefield requirement that the defendant
and the challenged jurors be members of the same racial group.
2. Waiver. According to the Indiana Court of Appeals decision
in Phillips v. State, 227 forfeiture of the right to be present for trial
requires -sufficient evidence to support a finding that the waiver was
knowing and intelligent. 228 Phillips, a Missouri attorney, proceeded pro
se. The record was unclear about whether Phillips had, received notice
of pretrial and trial dates. When Phillips called the prosecutor to ascertain
the trial date, he was advised that the trial had occurred a few days
earlier. Not surprisingly, Phillips, had lost.
On appeal, the court held that the right to be present at trial is
22
fundamental to a fair trial. ' As a consequence, waiver of the right
would be controlled by the standard of Johnson v. Zerbst. 230 A finding
of waiver must be supported by evidence sufficient to show an intentional
relinquishment of a known right. 231 A statement by the court reporter
that notice of the trial date would have been mailed to the defendant
232
is insufficient to support such a finding. Evidence sufficient to meet
the standard should demonstrate that the defendant knew of the trial
date and, by his absence, intended to avoid trial. 233
3. Instructions. In the Indiana Supreme Court decision of Madden
v. State, 234 the trial court had instructed the jury that "[i]t is not essential
in this cause that the testimony of the prosecuting witness be corroborated
by other evidence-. It is sufficient if, from all the evidence, you believe
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes wtre committed by the
Defendant as alleged. " 235 Madden, the defendant, objected on the ground
.

226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

.

.

Holland,- 110 S. Ct. at 813 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
S4l N.E.ld 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
ld. at 648.
ld.
304 U.S. 4S8 (1938).
Phillips, S43 N.E.2d at 648.
ld.
Id. at 649.
S49 N.E.2d 1030 (Ind. 1990),
/d. at 1033.

.

.

.
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that the instruction over-emphasized the victim's testimony. On appeal.
the majority recognized that when more than one witness testifies, it is
improper for a trial court to comment on or emphasize a particular
witness's. testimony. 236 Nevertheless, the majority concluded that because
only the victim had testified regarding identification of the accused and
the acts he had perpetrated on her, 237 and because her testimony need
not be corroborated, the instruction was appropriate. 238
In his dissent, Justice DeBruler provided a powerful condemnation
of the instruction. The rule suggesting that a conviction may rest on
the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is an appellate standard of
review, not a standard to be applied by the trier of fact. 239 Justice
DeBruler also noted that lack of corroboration is a legitimate element
for the trier of fact to consider in determining the credibility of witnesses
and the weight to be accorded to such testimony. 240 The instruction,
however, strongly suggested that the jury should not consider the lack
of corroboration as it affects the witness's credibility or the weight of
the testimony. Last, a general instruction on credibility and weight,
applicable to all testimony, could include an explanation regarding corroboration to provide a balanced and fair instruction. Given all this,
Justice DeBruler would have found that the challenged instruction ~as
improper because it called special and specific attention to an individual
witness, namely the State's key witness. 241
In another jury instruction case, Pinegar v. State, 242 the Indiana
Court of Appeals found that the defenses of heat of passion and selfdefense are not inherently inconsistent.243 If there is evidence to support
each defense, both should be submitted to the jury. Pinegar was a
homicide case in which the evidence demonstrated that the victim sought
the confrontation and struck the first blow. The trial court instructed
on self..;defense, but refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, that
is, murder mitigated by sudden heat. The court of appeals rejected the
State's assertion that dicta in Ward v. Stattfl44 compelled the conclusion

236. /d.
237 .. The significance of this statement is unclear. That an individual witness is the
only witness on a particular point is the norm in multiwitness trials. Trials in which all
witnesses testify on all issues are atypical. Focusing special attention on the-testimony of
a single witness has been previously condemned, as Justice DeBruler observed in Hackett
v. State, 266 Ind. 103, 360 N.E,.2d 1000 (1977).
238. Madden, S49 N.E.2d at 1033.
239. ld. at 1035 (DeBrueler, J., dissenting).
240. /d.
241. ld. at 1036.
242.. S53 N.E.2d S2S (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
243. /d. at 528.
244. 519 N.E.2d S61 (Ind. 1988).,
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that killing in sudden heat was inherently inconsistent with self-defense.24s
The Indiana Supreme Court stated that the particular facts of Ward
presented a self-defense, not a sudden heat, question. 246 The Court of
Appeals found the language restricted to the facts of Ward. 247 Both
defenses can admit the existence of the crime of murder, which is the
knowing or intentional killing of another human being. 248 Self-defense
offers a complete defense, that is, the knowing and intentional killing
was justified because the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent
serious bodily injury to oneself or others. 249 Heat of passion offers a
partial defense; that is, the knowing or intentional killing occurred while
acting under the sudden heat of passion. 2so
When the accused is actually provoked and responds, self-defense
and sudden heat both may be appropriate. The jury, not the court,
should determine whether the force utilized was reasonable (self-defense),
or whether the force was excessive, but utilized in the sudden heat
generated by the initial attack (voluntary manslaughter).~• Thus, if the
facts warrant, the trial court should charge the jury on both defenses.

H.

Guilty Pleas

The Indiana Supreme Court retreated from yet another aspect of
previously fixed rules pertaining to guilty pleas, as originally set forth
in German v. State. 252 In German, the court held that a trial judge must
personally inform the defendant of all the rights, among other things,
forfeited by a guilty plea. 253 Failure to do so would require reversal. 2s4
In White v. State, 2s' the Indiana Supreme Court limited the German
rule, and' 'h eld that only the trial court's failure to inform the defendant
of the right to a jury trial, the right of confrontation, or the right
against self-incrimination requires automatic reversal. 2s6 Other omissions
must be coupled with a sbowing that the omission actually rendered the

plea involuntary or unintelligent. 257

245. Pinegar~ 533 N.E.2d at 528.
246. Ward, 519 N.E.2d at S63.
247. /d.
248. IND. CODE § 35-42-1·1 (l988 & Supp. 1990).
249. /d. § 3541-3-2 (1988).
250. /d. § 35-42-l-3.
251. Pinegar, 533 N.E.ld at 528~
252. 428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981).
253. /d. at 236.
254. /d. at 237.
255. 497 N .E.2d 893 (Ind. 1986).
256~ /d. at 905-06.
257. /d. at 901.
•
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In Youngblood v. State, 2' 8 the supreme court, without reference to
German, ruled that a guilty plea record devoid of any personal advisement
by the trial court may be rehabilitated by the later presentation of
evidence. 2' 9 The court rejected the existence of any right to an advisement
by the trial court. 260 The defense counsel's postconviction testimony that
the defendant was advised of his rights by · counsel was sufficient to
establish that the original plea was voluntary and intelligent. 261
Justice DeBruler dissented, and equated the personal advisement rule
with Miranda rights. 262 The purpose of the rule is to safeguard the
underlying rights. 263 By requiring a colloquy between the trial judge and
the defendant, the record would reflect not only the defendant's knowledge of the rights but also a manifestation of a freely made decision
to forego those rights. 264 Rehabilitation of the record by postconviction
testimony may demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of his rights, but
it may not provide any manifestation of a decision to forego the rights
freely made . by the defendant. 265 In Youngblood, no manifestation of
waiver was presented. Nevertheless, the majority found the plea to be
valid. 266
Prosecutorial "persuasion" in the form of an offer to forego filing
a habitual offender count in exchange for an immediate, uncounseled
guilty plea was addressed by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Hood v.
State. 261 Hood was arrested on April 25, 1986 and incarcerated. Prior
to his initial hearing, a prosecutor approached Hood and offered to
forego filing a habitual offender count if Hood immediately pleaded
guilty, without counsel, to the charged offenses of theft and forgery.
Hood pleaded guilty, and thereafter sought post-conviction relief.
On appeal, the court acknowledged that a defendant can be threat . .
ened with the filing of an habitual count to induce a plea. 268 Thus, the
prosecutor in Hood could make use of such a threat. However, the
prosecutor's insistence on an uncounseled plea was not permissible. 269
258.
259.

542 N.E.2d 188 (Ind. 1989).

/d. at 189.
260. /d.

/d.
!d. at 190 (DeBruler, J., dissenting).
ld.
264. ld.
265. /d.
266. Id. at 189.
267. 546 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
268. Id. at 849. Courts see little differen~e between an offer to forego filing the
habitual count to induce a plea and the practice of filing the habitual count and subsequently
offering to dismiss it in exchange for a plea. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434
U.S. 357 (1978); Jackson v. State, 499 N.E.2d 21S (Ind. 1986).
269. Hood, S46 N.E.2d at 849.
261.
262.
263.
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The court suggested that plea bargaining is premised on the notion
that a defendant, advised by counsel and protected by procedural safeguards, is capable of making intelligent choices. 270 ''Conversely, uncounseled defendants are considered incapable of intellig.e nt
271
choices .... " Uncounseled defendants generally are not informed of
matters involving likelihood of conviction, probable punishment, and
the legal consequences of their conduct.
In addition to stating its view on the value of counsel in plea
bargaining, the court referred to federal cases holding that counsel or
a valid waiver of counsel is a prerequisite to permissible plea bargaining.
Thus, the court appeared to be ready to decide that prosecutorial plea
bargaining with an uncounseled defendant vitiates the voluntariness of
any resulting plea; however, the court did not decide that issue. The
court found that the facts in Hood were more egregious than that of
a defendant who simply negotiated without counsel because the prosecutor
in Hood insisted that the defendant waive the right to counsel.272 The
court concluded that the State's act of conditioning its offer on the
defendant's agreement to forego counsel rendered the plea per se involuntary.273 Voluntariness was not restored by the defendant's waiver
of counsel at the guilty plea hearing because that waiver was tainted
by the State's prior action. 274

I.

Sentencing

The Indiana courts of appeal decided three significant cases dealing
with the use of "aggravating circumstances" at sentencing. The Indiana
Supreme Court holding in Willoughby v. State'-75 authorizes a trial court
to consider uncharged criminal conduct as an aggravating circumstance
for purposes of sentencing. 276 Willoughby was convicted of murder,
robbery, and confinement. During the police investigation on those
charges, Willoughby admitted that he disposed of a body in 1975 and
that he did not report the event to authorities. This prior conduct was
unrelated to the charges actually brought against him. At the time of
sentencing, the trial court found that the prior unrelated conduct was
an aggravating circumstance.277 Willoughby's sentence was enhanced for
this and other reasons.
•

270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
215.
276.
277.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.

/d. at 850.
S52 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 1990).
/d. at 470.
/d. at 471.
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On appeal, the- Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the prior
unrelated conduct properly could be considered as evidence that Willoughby was a criminal accessory after the fact. 278 The fact that the
conduct had not resulted in a conviction or even in the filing of a
charge did not preclude its use at sentencing. The court relied on Starks
v. State'-19 to support its holding. 280 Starks, however, involved pending
charges .. Arguably, as the concurring and dissenting opinion suggested,
pending charges should be considered, not as evidence of criminal conduct, but as evidence that the prior exercise of police authority over
the defendant has had no deterrent effect. 281
Use of either prior arrest records or uncharged conduct as evidence
of prior criminal activity is problematic. The problem arises because the
evidentiary rules applicable to trial do not apply to sentencing proceedings. 282 Thus; for example, hearsay is admissible. Few courts have developed any guidelines to ensure that the evidence of uncharged criminal
conduct is reliable" Indiana courts have not done so, nor has Indiana
addressed the scope of a defe~dant's right to challenge such assertions.
A defendant confronted with such evidence should be entitled to adequate
notice and a hearing to challenge the State's evidence and offer a
response. 283 Thus, defendants c_onfronted with such _allegations should
make a record on the issue.
ln Conwell v. State,284 the court of appeals found that when a
defendant pleads guilty to a lesser-included offense, the trial court may
not use the element that distinguishes the lesser from the greater offense
as an aggravating factor. 285 Conwell was charged with burglary. The
charge was classified as a B felony because_the building involved was
a dwelling. He pleaded guilty to burglary as a C felony pursuant to a
plea agreement. At sentencing, the trial court found that the defendant's
lack of any criminal history was a_mitigating circumstance. The court
also found an aggravating circumstance
the burglarized building was

278. Id~ at 470.
279. 489 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. 1986).
280. Willoughby, SS2 N.E.2d at 470.
281. /d. at 471 (DeBruler,_ J., concurring and dissenting).
282. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949).
283. It is reasonable to assume that the procedural protections which attach to a
sentencing hearing would at least be equal to those available in parole revocation hearings.
See Morrissey v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (right to· notice, disclosure of the State's
evidence, opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses, cross~xamine, and confrontation
unless good cause is shown). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. S39 (1974) (in prison
disciplinary hearing, defendant has right to adequate notice and to call witnesses to respond
to the allegations).
284. S42 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
285. Id. at 1025.

•
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a dwelling. Conwell was sentenced to eight years, a presumptive term
of five years with three years added for aggravating circumstances.
The court of appeals analogized Conwell's situation to the facts of
Hammons v. State. 2~ In Hammons, the Indiana Supreme Court found
that a trial court may not impose the maximum sentence on the lesser
offense to c_ompensate for the perceived error made by a jury in acquitting
the defendant on the greater charge. 287 The court of appeals found no
distinction between a jury verdict and a plea of guilty. 288 In either case,
the element that distinguishes the greater from the lesser offense may
not be used to enhance the defendant's sentence.289
The last noteworthy case decided in Indiana pertaining to aggravating
circumstances is Lane v. State. 290 In Lane, a trial court utilized as an
aggravating factor the fact that the defendant, as a juvenile, had been
adjudicated as a CHINS (Children In Need of Services). Noting that
juveniles adjudged to be CHINS are victims of their circumstances, not
juvenile criminals, the court of appeals reversed. 291 Although a juvenile
history of criminal acts can serve as an aggravating circumstance, 292 one's
status as a CHINS may not so serve.
The next noteworthy sentencing case is the Indiana Supreme Court's
decision in Seay v. State. 293 From July 14, 1986 to September 2, 1986,
the defendant sold controlled substances on four occasions to an undercover policeman and an informant. In February 1987, the defendant
was tried on the two counts that arose from the first two sales. He
was convicted, found to be an habitual offender, and sentenced to sixty
years. While the jury was deliberating in that case, the State filed two
new counts based on the last two sales, and again sought the habitual
offender enhancement. Seay was tried on the new charges, found guilty,
fifteen years on each count, consecutive
and sentenced to sixty years
to one another
with one count enhanced by thirty years for the
habitual finding. This sentence was imposed consecutive to the first
sentence of sixty years.
Seay challenged the second trial on various grounds. On appeal, the
supreme court rejected the claim that the State was required to join the

286. 493 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. 1986).
287. Id. at 1253.
288. Conwell, S42 N .. E.2d at 102S.
289. /d.
290. 551 N.E.2d 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
291. ld. at 899.
292. See Jordan v. State, S12 N.E.2d 407 (Ind.), reh. denied, Sl6 N.E.2d 1054
(Ind. 1987).
293. SSO N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1990).

·
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four charges in one prosecution, as well as the claim that collateral
estoppel barred the second prosecution. 294 However, relying on Starks
v. State, 29$ the court found that the State is barred from seeking multiple
habitual offender enhancements by bringing successive prosecutions for
charges that could have been consolidated for trial. 296 Thus, whether the
State seeks two habitual offender enhancements in one trial or ,separates
the charges by initially withholding the filing of all available charges,
the State may not secure consecutive habitual offender enhancements. 297
Last, pertaining to sentencing, the legislature provided two significant
developments. First, the presumptive sentence for a class C felony was
reduced from five to four years; four years, instead of three, may now
be added for aggravating circumstances; and two years, instead of three,
subtracted for mitigating circumstances. 298 In short, the sentencing range
for a class_C felony remains two to eight years, only the presumptive
sentence is changed. The presumptive sentence for a class D felony was
reduced from two years to a year and a half. 299 A year and a half,
instead of two, may be added for aggravating, circumstances. 300 There
,;

/d. at 1288. Indiana's statutory bars to subsequent prosecutions are set forth
IND. CODE § 35-34-1-IO(c) (198'8) and IND. CODE § 35-41-4-4 (1988). Both speak in
294.

in

terms of bars to prosecutions for offenses that ucould have been joined" or "should
have been charged.'' Nevertheless. case law interpretations have preserved to the State
the right not to pursue all charges in a unified action. See Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d
180 (Ind~ 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1984). Thus, without fear of any subsequent
bar, the State may separate offenses by not filing some of the charges. even if all the
offenses were committed at the same time or during the same criminal episode. But see
Grady v. Corbin, 110 S~ Ct. 2084 (1990) (double jeopardy discussion regarding offenses
involving the same conduct).
295. 523 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 1988) (trial courts lack the power to require that habitual
offender sentences run consecutively when meting out several sentences).
296. Seay. SSO N.E.2d at 1288. It is interesting to note that the court, for purposes
of determining jf a bar to subsequent prosecution existed. found the mandatory joinder
requirement of Indiana Code § 35-34-1-1 O(b) applicable only to charges actually filed.
IND. CoDE § 35-34-1-lO(b) (1988) (mandatory duty to join related charges arising_ to
common scheme or plan). Yet. the court found that the second set of charges against
Seay, which were not filed until after the first trial, could have been joined with the
initial charges for purposes of determining that pyramiding habitual offender _sentences
could not be sought. Seay, SSO N.E.2d at 1288. It appears that the State retains the
ability to withhold charges and force separate trials, but loses part of the incentive to
do so.
297. Oddly, in Starks, 523 N.E.2d at 737, the remand order directed the_trial court
to order the two habitual offender enhanced sentences to run concurrently. but in Seay,
the remand order directed the trial court to vacate the- habitual offender sentence enhancement. Seay, SSO N.E.2d at 1289.
298. IND. CoDB § 35-S0-2-6 (1988 & Supp. 1990).
'299.. /d. § 35-S0-2-1~
300. ld.
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was no change in the possible one-year reduction for mitigating circum'stances. The range for a class D felony is now one-half year to three
years instead of one to four years.
The second legislative development was the approval of the •'Boot
Camp For Youthful Offenders.''301 This statute is intended to allow the
Department of Corrections to create a facility for youthful offenders
that provides a paramilitary environment emphasizing discipline, physical
development, treatment intervention, and value modification.302 The program is limited to youthful offenders between the ages of eighteen and
twenty-five years, with no prior convictions who al-e serving a sentence.
of less than eight years. 303 If the boot camp is successfully completed,
the offender is returned to the sentencing court for further disposition. 304
The concept has not been implemented yet for want of funding. 30'
,

J.

Post-conviction

The United States Supreme Court continued its practice of gutting
a defendant's right to a meaningful federal review of state court convictions.306 In Butler v. McKellar,'Jm the Court "fine tuned" the rule
that in both capital and noncapital cases, ''new rules will not be applied
or announced in cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of
two exceptions."308 The exceptions are as follows: (1) The new rule
places the conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority
to proscribe; and (2) the new rule is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty. 309
•

301. /d. §§ 11-14-J ... J to 4 4 (Supp. 1990).
302. /d. § 11-14-2-S.
303. /d. § 11-14-1-S.
304. Id. § 11-14·4 4.
JOS. Conversation with Hon. Raymond D. Kickbush, Judge. Porter Circuit Court
(March 12, 1991) (Judge Kickbush was the principal ·proponent of the boot-camp concept.).
306. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), overruling Fay v. Noia,
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (a state procedural default ban habeas relief only if the petitioner
deliberately bypassed the state courts, and the petitioner must show cause and prejudice
to excuse a state court procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 46S (1976) (eliminating
fourth-amendment claims by state prisoners from habeas review); Teague v. Lane, 109
S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (no new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will be announced
on habeas review unless those rules will be applied retroactively to all defendants similarly
situated).
307. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990).
308. Id. at 1216 (emphasis added) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934,
2944 (1989} (citation omitted)}.
309. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1063.64 (1990). The likelihoOd that the
current United States Supreme Court would find a .. new rule" that meets either exception
is similar to the likelihood that a resurrected Casanova would find something new about

sex.

•
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In Butler,_the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a
rule is new or dictated by existing precedent. The petitioner in Butler
had been arrested on an assault and battery charge. He invoked his
constitutional right. to counsel and retained a lawyer. Thereafter, the
police informed him that he was a suspect in an unrelated murder case.
Butler was again given Miranda warnings; he waived his rights and made
a statement. The statement was utilized, over Butler's objection, in the
state court homicide trial in which he was convicted.
Butler sought federal habeas relief on the ground that the police
should not have initiated questioning on the unrelated murder knowing
that he had invoked his right to counsel on the assault and battery case.
Butler argued that Edwards v. Arizona310 required the police to refrain
from initiating any questioning once the accused invokes his right to
counsel on any ciffense. 311 Butler relied on United States ex rei Espinoza
313
v. Fairman312 which interpreted Edwards to support
Butler's
claim.
.
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected his argument,
finding that Edwards did not preclude questioning on an entirely different
charge..314 The Fourth Circuit found that the contrary holding at the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Espinoza was an unpersuasive and dramatic
3
extension of Edwards. "
On the same day that the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing, the
Supreme Court decided Arizona v.. Ri!berson. 316 The Court in Roberson
held that the fifth amendment bars-police-initiated interrogation following
an accused's request for counsel in a separate investigation. 317
Butler sought, and the Supreme Court granted, certiorari. 318 The
Supreme Court found that Butler could not rely on Roberson because
319
Roberson announced a new rule. Butler pointed out that the majority
in Roberson had said the case was_directly ·controlled by Edwards and
that, in Roberson, Arizona had specifically asked the Court to create
an exception to Edwards. 320 Notwithstanding, the majority in Butler
found that a new rule is announced even if a prior decision controls
the result, but that result is ''susceptible to debate among reasonable
321
minds. "
'
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315.
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u.s.

486
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477 (1981).
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1214.
813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987).
Butler. 110 S. Ct. at 1215.
Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 2SS (4th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 258.
675 (1988).

Id. at 687 . .88.
109 S. Ct. 19S2 (1989).
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218.
/d.
Id. at 1217.
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As the dissent noted, Butler apparently held that a ruling sought
by a habeas petitioner will be deemed ''new'' unless the challenged
procedure ''was so clearly invalid under the then prevailing legal standards
that the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist.'' 322
As indicated, new rules will neither be applied nor announced on habeas
unless the petitioner falls into one of two previously stated exceptions. 323
Given Butler's broad definition of "new rule" and the rigor of the two
exceptions to the ''new rule'' doctrine, one can conclude that the review
available to state prisoners on federal habeas has been substantially
diminished.

K.

Death Penalty

The most significant death penalty case for Indiana practitioners is
Daniels v. State. 324 This case is significant because the Indiana Supreme
Court has chosen to adopt the federal habeas ''new rule'' doctrine and
apply the same to Indiana postconviction proceedings. 325 In Daniels, the
defendant was convicted of felony murder, among other charges, and
sentenced to death. At the penalty phase, the prosecutor made statements
concerning personal characteristics of the victim. The statements probably
offended the rulings in Booth v. MarylanrP 26 and South Carolina v.
Gathers321 because descriptions of the victim's personal characteristics
and descriptions of the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's
family, both of which involve factors not known to the defendant at
the time of the offense, are unrelated to the blameworthiness of the
defendant and, therefore, are inconsistent with the reasoned decisionmaking required in capital cases. 328
Daniels presented the Booth claim in post-conviction proceedings.
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim on the merits. 329 The
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the ca~~
for reconsideration in light of Gathers. 330
On remand, the Indiana Supreme Court abandoned its established
rule on retroactivity, 331 noting that its prior position had been influenced

ld. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
ld. at 1218.
561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1990).
ld. at 489.
482 u.s. 496 (1987).
109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989).
See South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989); Booth v. Maryland,
482 u.s. 496 (1987).
329. Daniels v. State, S28 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988).
330. See Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2207.
331. See Rowley v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (Ind. 1985) (a new rule should
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
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by then-existing federal case law. 332 The court found that federal revisions,
as set forth in Teague v. Lane333 and Penry v. Lynaugh,334 suggested
335
that an analogous revision was appropriate for Indiana.
Thus, the
court adopted the principle that new rules will not be applied in Indiana
collateral proceedings unless the rule falls within one of two exceptions:
(1) The rule places certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe; and (2) the rule requires the
observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and
without which the likelihood of ·an accurate conviction is seriously diminished.336 The court, while noting that the State was not asserting
waiver, concluded that Bo.oth and Gathers announced a new rule, and
that rule did not qualify under either exception. 337
Clearly, the ·m ajority decision in Daniels ·narrows the scope of available review in postconviction proceedings. This restriction is damaging,
particularly to death penalty litigants; because of the dynamic nature
of death penalty law.338 The narrowing scope of state and federal review
can be seen as part of the ongoing effort to accord greater finality to
criminal judgments. Finality may have virtue, but the vice of finality
is uncorrected error.
•

be applied retroactively and, thus, be available in postconviction proceedings if the rule
is directly designed to enhance the reliability of criminal trials rather than being only
tangentially related tO truth finding).
332. Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 488-89.
333. 489 u.s. 288 (1989).;
334. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989).
335. Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 489.
336. /d. The court noted that the second exception has been defined, in federal
cases, as requiring a new rule that "must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our
understanding_of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.''
/d. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990)). The court a,Jso pointed out
that the exceptions may prove inadequate and other particularized exceptions may be
required. /d. at 490 n.3.
337. Id. at 490·91. Justice DeBruler dissented and observed that the court had
previously addressed the merits of the Booth claim in Daniels's direct appeal from denial
of postconviction relief. /d. at 492 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). See Daniels v. State, S28
N.E.2d 775 (1988). Given this fact and that the remand order called for the court to
address the same issue again in light of Gathers,_the dissent co;tcluded that the threshold
question of whether to address the merits was not before the court. Daniels, 561 N.E.2d
at 492 (DeBrueler, J., dissenting).
338. Recall that under the federal definition. a rule is a "new rule" unless the
challenged procedure ''was so clearly invalid under then prevailing_ legal standards that
the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist." Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1219
(Brennan, J ., dissenting). Thus, a slight variation in the application of a principle may
trigger the ''new rule'' doctrine. Dynamic :areas of the law inevitably involve many such
slight variations.
0
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CONCLUSION

The United States Supreme Court and the Indiana courts continue
to allocate a large portion of their respective dockets to criminal cases.
Working through the implicit tension between our interest in crime
enforcement and our interest in procedural fairness is a never-ending

process.

